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ABSTRACT:  
 The article discusses an important topic on the agenda of the intelligence studies, 
namely the consumer–producer relations as regards the intelligence cycle. Far from being an 
easy to grasp subject, the debate is significant at least for the persistent fears expressed by the 
public opinion about intelligence being politicized. We highlight the idea that by definition the 
intelligence activity may be considered politicized and the challenge would be to better clarify 
the term `politicized`. The tribal tongues phenomenon characterize the intelligence–policy 
relation as the two tribes have divergent perspectives and missions. While the intelligence is 
invested with attributes like objectivity and expertize, the policy realm speaks the language of 
subjectivity and preferences. 
Therefore, understanding and discussing the consumer–producer relations (a syntagm 
used in intelligence studies) is of highest importance, given that intelligence can be after all 
easily politicized as long as it is defined as an adjunct to policy.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The expression `tribal tongues` was first formulated by Mark Lowenthal (1992) in 
order to describe the relation between intelligence and policy. The theme of intelligence–
policy relation in a democratic society is a matter of vital importance as intelligence agencies 
exist in order to support political decisions and are specifically designed to collect and 
interpret information about the international security environment. As the role of intelligence 
in national security is uncertain the issue represents a basic problem (Rovner 2011).  The 
question is a major theme of reflection for thinkers and specialists in the field of Intelligence 
Studies, an academic discipline that has a relatively short history. Intelligently, Warner (2014, 
25) emphasizes the relevance of having such an academic field of study by pointing the same 
idea: even if espionage has a long history and got along just fine for thousands of years 
without much scholarly reflection, longevity does not automatically mean understanding, thus 
confirming the need for an academic approach of intelligence. The first book considered 
representative for this field of study was written by Sherman Kent in 1949.  
Being a major theme in intelligence studies, defining the relation between policy and 
intelligence involves defining the role of intelligence. Usually, the role of intelligence is 
expressed in terms like to support policy makers, yet the support might presume myriad ways 
to perform the task. Traditionally, intelligence agencies exist for four reasons: to avoid 
strategic surprise, to provide long-term expertise, to support policy process and to maintain 
the secrecy (Lowenthal 2015, 2). Without a constant resort to political decisions, the 
intelligence process has no reason. To ignore the knowledge interests of the political factors 
would mean to abandon the basic mission of the intelligence organizations. The intelligence 
services are designed to offer expertise and knowledge related to subjects which have a 
profound socio-political implications. Shulsky and Schmitt (2002, xii)  express the same idea, 
intelligence should have become, less of a “cloak and dagger” affair and more like a branch of 
the social sciences, seeking to analyze and ultimately predict political, economic, social, and 
military matters. 
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`Intelligence estimates play an important role in strategic judgment, adding unique 
kinds of information and insight to help leaders cope with the inherent uncertainty and 
complexity of international politics.`  (Rovner  2011, vii) 
The difficulty of the relation is of highest importance, given that intelligence can be 
after all easily politicized as long as it is defined as an adjunct to policy. The tribal tongues 
phenomenon suggests that the intelligence – policy relation are inherently difficult as the two 
tribes have somehow divergent perspectives and missions. While the intelligence is invested 
with attributes like objectivity and expertize, the policy realm speaks the language of 
subjectivity and preferences. 
Therefore, understanding and discussing the consumer – producer relations involves 
the theme of politicization of intelligence, usually perceived in pejorative terms, as a negative 
aspect. The syntagm is not well clarified and understood, being an ambiguous concept. 
POLITICIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE MAY COME IN MANY FLAVORS  
The relationship intelligence–policy is a complicated one. Most specialists think that 
the ideal relation between intelligence and policymakers should be defined by two terms: 
objectivity and relevance. If the intelligence analysts would be totally independent, then their 
products would probably not address the political dilemmas. The other way round, if the 
relation would be too close between the two tribes that would affect the objectivity of the 
analysis.  Rovner (2011) notices that `the existing literature on intelligence-policy relations 
relies on ambiguous concepts that are alternately confusing, all encompassing, or 
contradictory. Politicization in particular seems to have as many definitions as there are 
authors using the term.` 
The politicization of intelligence can be perceived as well as inevitable and a must. 
The policy makers play a central role for every step composing the intelligence cycle and it 
would be a big mistake to be excluded. The policymakers must be understood as being less 
than the beneficiaries of the intelligence products, in fact they are the key players in designing 
the intelligence cycle. The relationship between the intelligence producers and intelligence 
consumers has important consequences for intelligence process. Even if there is a negative 
perception, that intelligence politicization is a bad thing, it is important to understand that 
defining politicization is even more important. Why? The intelligence agencies do not have 
political interests per se, yet the intelligence analysis must have relevance for political 
decisions, in order to improve the capacity to rationalize ends and strategies, to reduce the 
inherent uncertainty when taking decisions and acting on international scene.    
 From a theoretical point of view, the intelligence services must be free in their 
endeavor to objectively analyze information, even if the data analyzed have political 
relevance and the analysis might formulate points of view that may sustain or invalidate some 
political options. Therefore, it is important not to ignore the political needs as the intelligence 
organizations must serve the society by providing expertize on different political, social, 
economic subjects. If the intelligence services provide information without being asked for, 
those intelligence products have little chances not to be taken into account.  
The role of intelligence services is very important within the socio–political system, 
therefore it is important to be clarified. The modality the government relates to intelligence 
represents the key in configuring the role of intelligence services for the society. Translating 
into practice is the hardest thing. Understanding the intelligence services as being 
`specifically designed to collect and interpret information about the international security 
environment` is a very flawed definition. It is not relevant to affirm that the core task of 
intelligence agencies is that of collecting information. By comparison, defining science as 
being nothing more than a process of `collecting data and interpreting information` would 
imply saying nothing relevant about its core mission. Likewise, defining intelligence agencies 
as collectors and analyzers of information says nothing important about their missions: as 
instruments used by policymakers in governance.  A syntagm like `the parallel state` would 
better describe a pathological relation between intelligence and policy, an undesirable social 
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condition, and at the other extreme would be the excessive harmony, another pathological 
relation. Within the literature of intelligence studies there have been identified and discussed 
many aspects that characterize pathological politicization, named as following: embedded 
assumptions, intelligence parochialism, bureaucratic parochialism, partisan intelligence, 
intelligence as scapegoat etc. As the intelligence tribe and the policy tribe speak different 
languages, the interaction is difficult. It is not something new that intelligence-policy relations 
do not always go well. The relations are occasionally poisonous (Rovner 2011).  
A certain degree of politicization of the intelligence is unavoidable, as the relation 
between the tribes is configured, as we have explained in an article entitled Intelligence and 
IR Constructivism (Leucea 2020), by a strategic culture and by paradigms adopted in 
interpreting the international security environment.  
ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND 
THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
We may assume that the `politicization` of intelligence starts from the very beginning 
of the intelligence cycle. Most specialists in intelligence studies do not consider the policy 
maker a part of the intelligence cycle, although there are authors (Lowenthal 2014, Schreier 
2010) who think that the policy maker should be included within the intelligence process and 
that it would be a mistake to be excluded. The political leaders are not just the beneficiaries of 
the intelligence products but they are the ones who configure the entire intelligence process 
by establishing the intelligence requirements. Without a constant connection to policy 
makers` requirements, the intelligence process has no ends and no meaning. 
`The intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy.` (Rovner 2011, ) 
A key component in linking the intelligence and policy tribes are the estimates of the 
international security environment, estimates which fundament the national security strategy, 
for instance. The assessment of the international security environment is an extremely 
complicated task. As we stated in a previous article (Leucea 2017), the difficulty of assessing 
the international security environment is similar to the academic endeavor to conceptualize 
the international systems in world history, theoretical instruments being necessary to be 
developed. Theoreticians of the world systems apprehend that the systemic perspective is 
created by the analyst. The same, the assessment of the international security environment 
depends on implicit or explicit assumed theoretical lenses. The policymakers and intelligence 
officers most often than not have divergent perspectives on national security policy and 
strategy, but in the process of conceiving the national security strategy both tribes are very 
much involved.  
The intelligence requirements are not abstract concepts, but compose a security 
agenda.  As theoreticians of the international systems notice, the systemic perspective of the 
international security environment is firstly and inevitably a theoretical artefact. In conceiving 
the national security strategy both tribes contribute. We may affirm that the intelligence gaps 
may be generated as well by the articulation between intelligence and policy in assessing the 
international security environment: prioritized topics by defining them as having national 
security relevance constructs as well the doctrine of intelligence collection. Intelligence 
agencies plan intelligence collection in accordance with national security estimates assumed 
and presented in strategic documents like the national security strategy. Formulations as `the 
international environment is constantly changing`, `the security environment is characterized 
mainly by the following major tendencies` or `the main risks and threats that can put in 
danger the national security of Romania are…` leave the impression of objective descriptions 
of the security environment but are imbued with subjectivism and are dependent on a 
particular security agenda.  
Therefore, the political leaders are, in fact, the first organizers of the intelligence 
process, and here is the very moment the `politicization` starts. That is the reason some 
experts advocate the intelligence cycle must incorporate the decision maker. The national 
security strategy is created by a political process in relation with the intelligence process. For 
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instance, Peter Jackson (2005, 15-18) highlights that the identification and interpretation of 
risks is a political activity, the possibility that the intelligence products to be influenced/biased 
by the policymakers’ perception being present during the entire intelligence cycle. From 
scratch, the political assumptions determines the risks prioritization and interpretation, a key 
aspect that influences the security agenda, the data collection as it prefigures which 
information is relevant for national security.  
Therefore, the politicization of intelligence may come in different flavors but the first 
step would be the national security strategy, respectively the assessment of the international 
security environment. The systemic ideological biases are functioning as cultural/perceptive 
lenses and are used in interpreting the world, playing an important role in selecting and 
identifying the security risks. From the very beginning of the intelligence process, assessing 
the international security environment is inherently influenced by cultural/theoretical filters 
used by intelligence analysts and policy makers in their construction the map of the 
international system, decisively influencing the manner in which the environment is 
perceived. The IR specialists emphasize the idea of a mediated perception of the international 
security environment:  
`It is equally important to analyze the manner in which the world politics is studied, 
the process of theorizing becoming a subject itself.` (Burchill & Linklater 2005) 
The assessment of the international security environment is not explicit in stating and 
assuming the impossibility in maintaining the distance between the knowledgeable subject 
and the object of study. The assessment is inherently subjective and can be considered an 
artefact being dependent on particular paradigmatic stances. The question of the role of 
theories for science is a fundamental one for any academic subject, yet the assessment of the 
international security environment leaves the impression of objectivity but it can as well be a 
source of misperception in international politics. Probably that is the reason the most common 
type of intelligence politicization is the tendency to configure the intelligence analysis in a 
manner which confirms and fills the policies underway (Jackson 2005, 15-18). That type of 
politicization determines the intelligence producers to confirm the expectances of the 
policymakers in order to avoid being marginalized, ignored or excluded.  
A very dangerous situation, favored by the relativity determined by the perceptive 
lenses, would be that of using intelligence services as instruments in implementing politics. 
At the same time, specialists highlight (Schreier 2010, 145) the need to expand the 
policymakers` role in strategic warning in order to overcome producer–consumer disconnects.  
`Strategic warning should be reconfigured as a governmental responsibility rather 
than an intelligence responsibility. Policymakers will have to make the challenging decisions 
about resource commitments for defense against future threats should have a direct role at 
every phase of the strategic warning process.` (Schreier 2010, 145) 
Another remarkable specialist in intelligence studies, Gregory Treverton (2004), 
invokes a ‘real intelligence cycle’ composed of five phases. The author formulates that in 
reality the intelligence community ‘infers’ the needs of policy-makers. David Omand (2014, 
66) as well mentions that in reality policy-makers are too busy – and often not sufficiently 
expert – to articulate their requirements. Instead the requirements are inferred by members of 
the intelligence community.   
CONCLUSIONS 
The tribal tongues phenomenon challenges much more the task to frame intelligence 
not as a specific activity or separate entity but rather in a broad context of knowledge 
production (Agrell & Treverton 2015, 3). To better frame intelligence and convey its meaning 
around the concept of science would mean facilitating finding answers to questions like those 
formulated by Mark Lowenthall (2009): what happens if the policy makers do not decide, find 
that they cannot decide, or fail to convey their priorities to the intelligence community? Who 
sets intelligence priorities then? 
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The intelligence – policy relation is a multifaceted phenomenon and has an evolving 
character. We may assume that the dynamics of the international security environment compel 
the relation between the two tribes to be as flexible and adaptable as the winds of change 
propel.  
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